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We propose a conceptual framework of policy deception to help identify, analyse and 
explain Brexit as a policy fiasco. The framework casts light on the political use of the 
device of an in/out European Union (EU) referendum by David Cameron. The paper 
develops the argument that the referendum did not offer a binary choice between two 
policy options for the United Kingdom’s (UK) relationship with the EU representing 
different, but commensurable preferences, because one option was ‘baseless’ in that it 
was unfounded in any policy analysis. The label of policy deception usefully reveals 
that many of the political, process and programme failures at the heart of the Brexit 
fiasco have their roots in the referendum. We conclude that the concept of policy 
deception contributes usefully to emerging work on why the Brexit policy fiasco 
occurred, and is likely to be a fruitful topic for future work.  




Brexit may well be remembered as a monumental policy fiasco (Kovac, 2017; McConnell 
and Tormey, 2019; Dunlop, James and Radaelli, 2019; Jennings and Lodge, 2019). However, 
the analysis of such failures is never a neutral or objective endeavour (Bovens and ‘t Hart, 
1996; Brändström and Kuipers, 2003; McConnell, 2016). Failures are never neatly classified 
but are constructed, declared and argued over in labelling processes that are not necessarily 
evidence-based (Bovens and ‘t Hart, 2016). This presents a challenge to those wishing to 
identify, analyse and explain Brexit as a policy fiasco.  
In this special issue, McConnell and Tormey (2019) argue that the inability of the 
Conservative government led by Prime Minister Theresa May to deliver a Brexit deal by 29 
March 2019 was a policy fiasco. They examine three main explanations for this: (1) Brexit as 
an impossible policy challenge; (2) ineffectual leadership by Theresa May, who took poor 
decisions and avoided plausible alternatives; (3) Westminster as a partisan-fuelled institution 
incapable of reaching an agreement on such a bi-partisan issue. The authors conclude that the 
Brexit fiasco cannot be reduced to a solitary explanation. Instead, analysts should focus on 
accounting for its complexity by attending to the interplay of agents, institutions/processes 
and the unique policy challenge of exiting the European Union (EU) within a specified 
timescale and amid intense inter- and intra- party divisions.  
Dunlop, James and Radaelli (2019) use a policy learning perspective to locate the 
Brexit fiasco in the period from June 2016 to May 2019, in contrast we concentrate our 
analysis in the run up to the 2016 referendum. Replacing David Cameron, Theresa May 
reported in the House of Commons that ‘when I first became Prime Minister in 2016 there 
was no ready-made blueprint for Brexit’ (May, 2018). Well over three years later, and after 
two general elections called on the issue of Brexit, there is still no blueprint. In October 2019, 
the journalist Martin Kettle wrote, “Brexit won the vote. But it’s an ideology not a policy. 
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When its supporters tried to turn it into policies, as they are still trying to do, it fell apart” 
(Kettle, 2019). In this paper, we argue that that the referendum did not offer a binary choice 
between two policy options for the United Kingdom’s (UK) relationship with the EU 
representing different, but commensurable preferences, because one option was ‘baseless’ in 
that it was unfounded in any policy analysis.  
Following McConnell’s (2016) criteria, we argue that the Brexit policy fiasco is a 
perfect storm of the following combined failures: political (failure of Cameron’s political 
performance in terms of winning the referendum and achieving his primary goal of a 
renegotiated agreement between the UK and the EU), process (failure to initiate and complete 
the necessary policy-making processes for exiting the EU) and programme (failure to design 
a policy framework for UK’s future relationship with the EU). We ask the question: Was the 
Brexit policy fiasco a case of policy deception? The paper develops the claim that the Leave 
option may be classed as such because it was a baseless voting option that deceived some 
voters into believing that leaving the EU was an established and available policy pathway.  
Policy fiascos 
Our analytic position is based upon the etymology of the word ‘fiasco’, which is theatre slang 
for ‘failure in performance’ and deriving from the Italian ‘far fiasco’, meaning to ‘suffer a 
complete breakdown in performance’ (Ayto, 2011). Used in the current context, fiascos are 
failures of political performance. However, the etymology of the word suggests that such 
failures may also involve deception. Before ‘fiasco’ was used in theatre, it derived from the 
Italian phrase to ‘make a bottle’. Why performance failures were linked to the bottles is 
unclear and disputed but, a ‘fiasco’ is a type of round-bottomed Italian bottle with its own 
tight-fitting straw basket. In 1574, a government decree fixed the capacity of the mezzo 
quarto bottle, with a vessel’s capacity certified by a lead seal applied to its outer straw casing 
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that stop purchasers seeing the contents inside. However, producers soon started re-using 
certified baskets on substandard vessels containing less liquid. As this fraud became 
commonplace, the Italian government subsequently decreed that the seal should be moved to 
the bottle’s mouth to stop deceit. 
The Brexit referendum was electoral process designed to enable voters to choose 
between the options an ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’, supposedly two equivalent ‘vessels’ 
containing different policy contents. If these binary ballot options were the same ‘size’, as 
measured by the official standards set for referendums, then the electoral process would be 
democratic and the choices equal. Thus, the UK’s Electoral Commission was tasked with 
choosing two official campaign groups that could be trusted to fill the two ‘standard-sized’ 
Brexit options fairly. By choosing ‘Britain Stronger In’ (‘Remain’) and ‘Vote Leave’ 
(‘Leave’), the Electoral Commission put its seal of approval on their approaches, which may 
have misled voters into believing they were both trustworthy and viable policy pathways. At 
the time of the referendum, many voters were unable to see through the ‘straw casing’ created 
by the Electoral Commission’s approval of Vote Leave as the official exit campaign, which 
stopped them seeing that the Leave option was an empty vessel, a policy deception.  
Paper overview 
Our purpose is to analyse whether Brexit should be labelled a ‘policy fiasco’ and to develop 
the concept of policy deception in the terms of how David Cameron, the Electoral 
Commission and Vote Leave helped create the Brexit policy fiasco. We first outline our 
conceptual framework of policy deception. Next, we analyse how Cameron’s handling of the 
2016 referendum led to his political failure by creating the Leave option for dramatic effect. 
Third, we discuss how the Leave option was included on the ballot paper even though it was 
not an equivalent thing in policy terms to the Remain option, which lead to a policy process 
failure. Fourth, we examine the multiple rationalities in the Leave option and how different 
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situated contexts and logics of Brexit and the policy tasks set by the referendum result 
leading to programme failure when the UK government tried, post-referendum, to deliver the 
Leave option. Finally, we discuss how these political, process and programme failures 
combined to create the Brexit policy fiasco. We draw the conclusion that Brexit was a policy 
fiasco and that policy deception may deserve further exploration as a concept in policy 
studies. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In 2019, the former Conservative prime minister, John Major, commented that, “When the 
nation voted on Brexit, they did so out of fiction and undeliverable promises” (Kennedy, 
2019). In our conceptual framework, we recast this Brexit fiction as policy deception. 
President Emmanuel Macron stated, ‘Brexit is the choice of the British people … pushed by 
those who predicted easy solutions … those people are liars’ (Merrick, 2018). We agree that 
the British people were misinformed, but we disagree with Macron’s classification of this 
misinformation as lies. We believe there is an important difference between lies and deceit 
and that, to fully understand the Brexit policy fiasco, understanding the difference between 
them as different types of untruth is vital. 
While policy studies has long identified a gap between constructions of policy success 
or failure and the actual value of a policy estimated by applied policy analysis (Bovens and ‘t 
Hart 1996), the possibility of deception implied by the gap has not been explored. Policy 
deception refers to the case where there are politically constructed public beliefs that a policy 
exists but these beliefs have no basis in any actual analysis that develops and compares 
systematically policy options, through some process and by some criteria. In our framework, 
we borrow heavily from Searle (2017), who uses money as an example of deception. He 
reports that modern currencies are ‘baseless’ because they are not backed by anything. If 
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customers enter a bank with $20 notes and ask to receive their value, they will not receive 
gold but instead similar paper notes. Searle (2017) does not argue that governments or banks 
use ‘lies’ because systematic deception does not require a ‘conscious intentional liar’. 
Instead, he views deceptions as widespread illusions or systematic falsehoods that are related 
to, or built into, social systems. For example, monetary value is not real but ‘observer-
relative’. The worth of your money depends upon your own valuation of its power, and your 
personal valuation does not have a linear, fixed relationship with the ascribed face value of 
the notes (Searle, 2017). Therefore, the orchestrated belief that money has an intrinsic worth 
is a systematic deception.  
We argue that a similar logic applies to the face value of a vote for the Leave option 
during the Brexit referendum. This option was baseless with no intrinsic value. Whatever 
worth people ascribed to the value of their vote was observer-relative and could not be 
cashed-in for any agreed set of policies or political outcomes. Moreover, Cameron’s failure to 
secure agreed terms for leaving before the referendum results were known contributed to the 
difficulty of cashing-in the UK’s decision to exit at a value acceptable to the government, 
parliament and many of the electorate. Therefore, although formal negotiations about the 
UK’s future relationship with the EU have not yet begun, Brexit may only be deliverable at a 
substantial economic loss to the UK rather than producing the substantial benefits promised 
by the Leave campaign. As a result, there is likely to be a significant difference between the 
expected and realised benefits of Britain’s withdrawal. Using Searle’s reasoning, this cost 
will be incurred because the Leave option was not based upon an agreed set of policies, with 
a known underlying policy analytical value.   
To establish the validity of our approach to policy deception, we provide an account 
of the idea that the Leave option was real, organised and deliverable as a system-wide deceit 
enabled by the decision to list the Leave option alongside Remain on the Brexit ballot paper. 
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To fully understand why the Brexit fiasco occurred, we must focus on how voters were 
systematically deceived into believing the Brexit referendum was no different from normal 
election campaigns in the sense that each of the voting options were real. 
The Electoral Commission’s remit was to ensure that the referendum was run with 
integrity and transparency of campaign funding and spending (Electoral Commission, 2015). 
At the time, there was no mechanism in place to ensure that Leave was real in the sense that 
the option was deliverable within a reasonable timeframe. As Cameron vowed to 
automatically implement the referendum outcome, the latter was now presented as an 
achievable policy alternative. If the referendum had not been declared by Cameron as a 
binding in/out choice, choosing to leave could have acted as a protest vote that stimulated 
wide-scale political debate and reform but with no real expectation that the UK would exit 
the EU. As political events forced Cameron to implement his in/out proposals, voters were 
faced with the Leave policy option, which was baseless in terms of contents, planning and 
delivery. 
Applied in the current context, we could also say that there was a common 
misconception that, because it appeared on the ballot paper, the Leave option was backed by 
the ‘something’ of a UK successfully functioning outside the institutions of the EU. 
According to the ontological analysis by Searle (2017), the common misconception that 
baseless objects, such as money, are real is due to widespread systematic deception, which is 
possible because some objects and people have ‘status functions’ imposed upon them (Searle, 
2017). 
POLITICAL FAILURE  
Policy deception occurs when there is widespread belief amongst voters that a baseless policy 
option has substance, even though the option is not backed by something deliverable in the 
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ways promised. In this section, we argue that the Leave option policy deception was first 
stimulated by Cameron’s misjudged political decision-making, which forced him to hold an 
EU referendum that with a baseless Leave option. The former Conservative prime minister, 
John Major, described Brexit as ‘the worst foreign policy decision in my lifetime’ (Price, 
2019). Here, we outline how Cameron’s political failure occurred, and suggest that his poor 
decision-making resulted in a widespread policy deception during the Brexit referendum.   
According to McConnell (2010), political failures occur when detrimental policy 
outcomes affect the ability of parties and individuals to obtain or to retain their positions in 
government and in the political system. In this section, we argue that Cameron’s personal 
decision to hold the Brexit referendum resulted in his personal political failure of having to 
resign his premiership. This occurred for three main reasons. First, this failure may be classed 
as Cameron’s own fault because he personally chose the referendum policy option when 
other options were available. Next, he decided to make the result of the referendum 
politically binding when this political commitment was unnecessary. Third, he risked his 
premiership on achieving a Remain victory, when he could have distanced himself 
completely from the referendum outcome by choosing not to lead the Remain campaign. 
Given the combination of such factors, Brexit has been called Cameron’s ‘great 
miscalculation’ (Glencross, 2016).  
According to Brummer (2016), inflexible leaders who exhibit deficiencies in 
information gathering and processing seem more likely to end up causing foreign policy 
fiascos. Cameron’s decision to stick steadfastly to his plans to hold an EU referendum to 
resolve ‘party management issues’ despite concerns from coalition partners, advisers and 
even Eurosceptic conservatives, suggests inflexibility (Oliver, 2016; Shipman, 2016; Smith, 
2016). Alternatively, Cameron’s victories in both the Alternative Vote referendum in 2011 
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and the Scottish referendum in 2014, along with his unexpected majority in the 2015 general 
election, gave him a reassuring run of political success. As such, Cameron may have become 
increasingly confident in his role as premier and believed that he could continuously win 
voter backing at the ballot box. This may have shaped his willingness to pursue his plans for 
an EU referendum regardless of the risks. This hypothesis fits with the common criticism that 
Cameron was a political risk-taker (Daddow, 2015; Smith, 2018). 
Cameron thought an EU referendum would be a turning point in his battle against 
Euroscepticism (Hobolt, 2016; Vasilopoulou, 2016). By offering an in/out ballot, he believed 
that he could simultaneously appease the Eurosceptics in his party, offer a less extreme 
political alternative to the UK Independence Party and end the growing political agitation by 
getting a better membership deal from an EU leadership fearful of a British exit. 
Telegraph article 
Cameron became prime minister of a coalition government in May 2010 because his 
Conservative party was not popular enough to govern alone. By 2012, he was accused of 
losing control as leader because of, among other matters, the rebellious call by 81 Tory 
members of parliament for an EU exit referendum (Kirkup, 2012). Cameron responded by 
writing an article for The Daily Telegraph, stating that he was ‘not against referendums on 
Europe’ but ‘we need to be absolutely clear about what we really want, what we now have 
and the best way of getting what is best for Britain. We need to answer those questions before 
jumping to questions about referendums’ (Cameron, 2012, para.2).  
In his article, Cameron also addressed the political issue of which democratic process 
would give voters the most influence, writing that the ‘problem with an in/out referendum is 
that it offers a single choice, whereas what I want - and what I believe the vast majority of the 
British people want - is to make changes to our relationship’ (Cameron, 2012, para.9). Within 
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a year, he changed his public position from political caution to openly accepting a simple 
in/out referendum. This unobligated change of course eventually led to his political failure. 
Bloomberg speech 
Cameron’s initial attempts to resolve the Europe issue were ineffective. In January 2013, he 
tried to create a turning point in his political fortunes by announcing at the London 
headquarters of the private media company, Bloomberg, his intention to negotiate a new 
settlement with the EU and to hold an in/out referendum on the UK’s membership (Cameron, 
2013). As leader of a coalition government, he knew that his pro-Europe partners, the Liberal 
Democrats, would not readily support a membership ballot. As it was generally expected that 
another coalition government would be formed after the upcoming 2015 general election, this 
position was unlikely to change. Therefore, the decision to announce an in/out referendum 
alongside the intention to radically renegotiate the institutional arrangements governing the 
UK’s membership was a strategic move rather than a plan that would necessarily materialise 
instantly. At home, his performance was regarded as a success with its intended political 
audience (Daddow, 2015). Delighted at the promise of an in/out referendum, Conservative 
MPs in Parliament ‘greeted Cameron with massive cheering and waving of order papers’ 
(Hoggart, 2013). 
During the Bloomberg speech, David Cameron announced that ‘democratic consent 
for the EU in Britain is now wafer thin’ and ‘those who refuse to contemplate consulting the 
British people, would in my view make more likely our eventual exit’ (Cameron, 2013). In 
contrast to the shackles applied by existing EU institutions, he would give the UK people the 
freedom to either support his new deal or leave the existing arrangements. As the situation 
required urgent reform, the enabling legislation would be passed as soon as the Conservative 
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government won the next election, and a referendum would be held within the first half of the 
next parliament. 
PROCESS FAILURE 
In 2016, UK Parliament’s foreign affairs select committee reported that Cameron’s 
government committed an act of gross negligence and deepened the uncertainty surrounding 
the impact of Brexit by instructing Whitehall not to make any contingency plans for a vote to 
leave the EU (Select Committee on the Constitution, 2016). The Government had initially 
suggested it was the responsibility of Vote Leave to explain what Leave would mean to the 
voters (Smith, 2016). The Treasury report released in April 2016 only outlined the economic 
impact from three possible models, but did not analyse the viability of the Leave option in 
full (HM Treasury, 2016). The former Cabinet Office Minister, Oliver Letwin, told the 
committee that no Brexit plans were ordered because it was possible they would leak and 
seen as unwarranted interference in the referendum campaign.  
Cameron’s failure to initiate and to complete the steps necessary to make Leave a 
policy option to be implemented before the 2016 referendum is a form of process failure on 
three counts. First, no process existed for transitioning any member state out of the EU, so 
this ballot option was technically ‘baseless’ in the sense used by Searle (2017). Second, 
Cameron personally negotiated and agreed terms with the EU for remaining but not for 
leaving. Third, the Leave option that appeared on the ballot paper was not equal in political 
feasibility to the renegotiated Remain choice. The metaphorical Leave bottle was empty, but 
Cameron never expected it to be opened, so the lack of content did not matter.  
Article 50 
To withdraw from the EU, member states must follow the legal and political processes 
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outlined in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, which states that ‘Any Member State 
may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements’ (European Parliament, 2016). European Council guidelines state that the EU 
shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with any country that notifies its intention to 
leave, setting out the arrangements for withdrawal and specifying the institutional framework 
for future relations. Following the Brexit referendum, the UK government triggered Article 
50 in March 2017, with the legal withdrawal scheduled to occur on 29 March 2019.  
Given the complexities involved in securing an exit process with 27 EU partners with 
no pre-written blueprint, negotiating an exit deal within two years of triggering Article 50 
was probably unrealistic. In 2016, the House of Lords reported that the government’s failure 
to set out its exit plans ‘caused uncertainty and confusion in the aftermath of the referendum’ 
(Select Committee on the Constitution, 2016, p. 7) and recommended that, 
Parliament may wish, in future, to ensure that detailed consideration is given to 
how the result of any referendum will be implemented in advance of the vote 
itself occurring, and to whether explicit provision should be made in the enabling 
legislation either to implement the outcome automatically or to instruct the 
Government to act on the result. 
The policy process for leaving the EU failed because the government did not negotiate 
implementable (EU-approved) plans for the UK’s withdrawal. This process failure 
contributed to the Brexit policy fiasco. 
Just as monetary denominations printed on paper notes are not backed by government 
gold reserves, the Leave option on the ballot papers was not backed by EU-approved, 
physically deliverable plans. Therefore, voters were systematically deceived by the official 
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ballot if they believed their votes were exchangeable, upon demand, for new institutional 
arrangements for a UK outside the EU.  
PROGRAMME FAILURE  
To leave the EU, parliament had to invoke Article 50 then negotiate an exit deal (within strict 
EU rules) agreeable to the other 27 member countries and to design and prepare for the 
implementation of a whole new suite of domestic policy to substitute for previous EU 
competences. To date, Brexit may be classed a programme failure because the policy 
outcomes suggested by the official Leave campaign have not been initiated within two years 
of triggering Article 50 (Vote Leave, 2016). It may be judged as being unsuccessful because 
the necessary and proposed programmes have not been designed and implemented within the 
expected timeframe. Trying to make the Leave option real has involved prolonged, but 
fruitless negotiations and imposed unexpected costs on the UK by creating economic 
uncertainty and the exit of investment, workers and firms.  
Vote Leave framework 
On 15 June 2016, during the last week of the campaign, Vote Leave published ‘A framework 
for taking back control and establishing a new UK–EU deal after 23 June’ (Vote Leave, 
2016). The document states that, following a Leave victory, the UK government will need to 
create a roadmap outlining to parliament the legislative steps needed to give effect to the 
public’s vote. According to Vote Leave (2016), there is no need to rush this important 
process because the ‘principles of the new settlement are clear and will be based on free trade 
and friendly intergovernmental cooperation’. Reflecting upon past experiences, the document 
also claims that it will be possible to negotiate a new settlement with the EU by the 2020 
general election. According to the Leave framework, the following circumstances would 
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enable quick progress: 
(1) Tariff-free trade between the UK and the EU already exists, so the parties will not 
need to negotiate the tariff lines on which duties will be abolished, only to continue 
the status quo. 
(2) Regulatory equivalence already exists, so detailed negotiations about the mutual 
recognition of product standards will be unnecessary because regulations are currently 
identical. Since non-tariff barriers are few, there will be no need to negotiate their 
abolition. 
As the actual progress of trade negotiations since the referendum suggests, Vote Leave’s 
claims were misleading (Edgington, 2019). Exiting the EU has not proven to be easy. To 
date, securing a deal agreeable to all member states and getting parliamentary agreement to 
change domestic law has not yet been possible. There is a real chance of the UK crashing out 
without a deal in 2020 following Boris Johnson’s win during the 2019 election (Woodcock, 
2019). As no-one can predict the future, Vote Leave’s misleading claims in their framework 
cannot be called lies, but they can be labelled deceptive and very unlikely to occur in 
practice.  
The purpose of publishing the framework for taking back control just before the 
referendum vote was not to portray the truth but to support the systematic deception that 
Leave was a deliverable policy option. Ironically, the document also clearly acknowledges 
that Leave was an empty policy bottle that would not be filled until after a referendum 
success. In a political sleight of hand, Vote Leave tried to convince voters that EU leaders 
and the British parliament would be happy to fill the empty vessel once the Leave option had 
been chosen, even though they had no proof that an exit would lead to the ready flow of 
enabling policies and laws. Using Searle’s example, this is similar to saying that the paper 
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money in your pocket today is baseless, but in the future (if you vote for it) there will be gold. 
DISCUSSION 
That Brexit is a complex phenomenon comprising a set of highly contingent combinations of 
factors over an extended temporal sequence is widely accepted in the academic literature 
(Thompson, 2017; McConnell and Tormey, 2019). Its evaluation as a policy fiasco, however, 
is much less settled, either within the live arenas of ongoing Brexit politics or from the 
viewpoints of academic spectators. In their review of the study of policy failures over the last 
twenty years, Bovens and ‘t Hart (2016) revisit their long-standing argument that the fiasco 
label is not a neutral classification that may be applied externally according to objectively 
verifiable standards but rather something constructed in the ‘framing contests’ of politics.  
In the practical politics of a referendum campaign, it is hard for voters to observe and 
to disentangle what is real. For instance, the Leave battle bus was emblazoned with the words 
‘We send the EU £350 million a week. Let’s fund our NHS instead.’ According to Cameron 
(Cameron, 2019, p. 688): ‘It wasn’t true. As Boris rode the bus around the country, he left the 
truth at home. We didn’t send £350 million a week to the EU.’ Regardless of the truth, the 
battle bus had a greater impact than Remain’s conventional, staged political events. This is 
probably because the Vote Leave did not feel constrained by standard policy rationality or 
evidence provided by experts. Instead, their campaign was aimed at giving voters the 
opportunity to develop new, post -EU identities with claims about post-EU programmes that 
were not grounded in policy analysis. For instance, Vote Leave stated that voting to exit 
could generate benefits by stopping the UK bearing substantial costs when Turkey joins the 
EU (Ker-Lindsay, 2018). In reality, as a member state, the UK will not have to bear any costs 
of the country becoming an EU member any time soon because Turkey has no reasonable 
chance of meeting the entry requirements (the EU’s 35 Accession chapters) in coming 
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decades. In response, Cameron’s advisers suggested that he announced that the country 
would not become an EU member while he was prime minister. He (Cameron, 2019, p. 669) 
writes: 
But I felt that would be irresponsible - the country was in the EU’s waiting room for a 
reason. And by saying a veto was necessary now was tantamount to accepting that it 
could join shortly. So, paralysis had me in its grip. I was caught between being a 
campaigner and being a prime minister, and I chose the latter, it truly was asymmetric 
warfare, I made the wrong choice. 
As this example suggests, Cameron experienced role conflict as the lead of the Remain 
campaign. While he was floundering, Vote Leave were able to make a whole range of 
deceptive policy promises and claims that, ultimately, helped them win the referendum. 
Therefore, we may conclude that Cameron caused the Brexit programme failure because he 
could not successfully perform his conflicting roles of EU negotiator, prime minister and 
political campaigner. In consequence, his failings helped create the Brexit policy fiasco. 
Political failure 
Given that the Brexit fiasco ended Cameron’s career as prime minister, when did his political 
failure begin? According to Wright and Cooper (2016), the Bloomberg address was the ‘start 
of the end of David Cameron’. This is because his change of direction created the possibility 
of an undesirable political outcome. Given this error in choosing an EU ballot, the writers ask 
whether Cameron was in favour of a referendum himself? They reply, ‘We don’t know for 
sure but the answer is probably not. That being said, Cameron certainly felt he had little 
choice over the issue’ (Wright and Cooper 2016: para. 12). However, Cameron knew the 
political risks because two of his predecessors, Margaret Thatcher and John Major, had been 
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forced to resign over Europe divisions in the Conservative party.  
Despite being advised otherwise, Cameron thought the referendum announcement 
was a gamble worth taking because, according to Wright and Cooper (2016), he believed the 
referendum would never happen. At the time, the prime minister calculated that Labour under 
Ed Miliband would not back the ballot plan, whereas his coalition partners were passionately 
opposed. Most importantly, in 2013, senior Tories - including Cameron - realistically thought 
they had no chance of winning an overall majority in the 2015 general election and that 
another coalition was likely. As a result, most people believed that the referendum pledge 
would be the first thing to go in coalition talks. If this was the case, there are grounds to claim 
that Cameron’s referendum pledge was designed to deceive both Eurosceptics at home and 
political leaders in Europe. 
Process failure 
The Brexit referendum resulted in a process failure because the Conservative government 
was unable to deliver the baseless Leave option. The prolonged political negotiations held 
after Article 50 was triggered demonstrate that, at the time of the referendum, the Leave 
option was baseless. In Searlean terms, voters were systematically deceived by the promise of 
post-EU institutional arrangements backed by the necessary political, legal and economic 
arrangements. We suggest that Leave was not an implementable policy option but a baseless 
political positioning that the prime minister did not initially expect to enact in practice or 
predict would ever need implementing. Even as the UK formally leaves the EU on 31 January 
2020, we still do not know much about the UK’s future relationship with the EU and any 
terms decided will not be those suggested at the time of the referendum. 
As the Leave option was introduced for political effect only, Cameron did not put the 
policy procedures in place to create a viable exit plan, secure agreement for that plan from 
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other EU member countries or have a clear and deliverable way to deliver the Leave option. 
As events forced Cameron to implement his political promise, the Leave option became a 
systematic deception that misled voters into believing that the official alternative to Remain 
was backed by something. Because EU leaders refused to accept the status function assigned 
to the Leave option, the post-referendum policy process failed to deliver the promised EU 
exit, thus contributing to the Brexit policy fiasco. 
Programme failure 
Given the lack of details about the type, nature and outcomes of policy programmes after an 
exit, Vote Leave deceived voters by suggesting imaginary political changes with imaginary 
socio-economic consequences. The key question is: why were so many voters deceived? 
Although there is a complexity of possible answers, Searle’s (2017) ontology of deception 
provides important insights. First, the Electoral Commission gave Vote Leave the status 
function of being an official campaign group, which implied to many voters that their claims 
were legitimate. Next, the hypothetical value of the policy programmes suggested by the 
Leave campaign did not have to be based upon anything real. To work as a political currency, 
Vote Leave’s claims only had to secure collective acceptance and did not have to be ‘cashed 
in’ at the time votes were cast.  
The Brexit programme failure has its foundations in the political promises made by 
Vote Leave. The lack of pre-agreed terms for Britain’s exit meant that Vote Leave could 
invent their own policy programmes and designate their face value without fear of 
contradiction. They could print their own ‘baseless’ political currency. In a conventional 
general election, parties produce manifestos outlining their proposed policies. In the EU 
referendum campaign, neither Remain or Leave produced a traditional manifesto. However, 
the remain option had the clearly defined policy position of staying in the EU under the terms 
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negotiated by Cameron and with forty years of accumulated policy development, whilst Vote 
Leave had no equivalent set of policies. In this void, Vote Leave made numerous policy 
claims and promises during the ten-week referendum campaign that did not later materialise 
and were able to claim that voters could ‘take back control’. Such promises may be viewed as 
‘illusions’ that, in themselves, they were baseless. 
Vote Leave was established to run one campaign only and did not have to consider 
the consequences of deceiving the public in any further elections. They were in a unique 
political position. Under contemporary institutional rules, the government, Parliament and the 
Electoral Commission had no jurisdiction over the truth content of Vote Leave’s political 
campaigns. Whilst Cameron led a traditional political campaign, his opponents had free reign 
to implement their version of populism, with official approval from the UK’s electoral 
institutions. The bottle was empty, voters were being systematically deceived, but Vote 
Leave had the official seal of parliament, the prime minister and the Electoral Commission. 
Cameron’s political gamble 
Whether Cameron should be held accountable for the Brexit policy failure depends not on 
what he did but on the available counterfactuals that he did not follow. Thompson (2017) 
argues that Cameron’s referendum decision was a gamble premised on the following 
assumptions. First, there was no prospect of the Conservative party winning the 2015 general 
election. Second, the other EU member states, particularly Germany, would not risk Britain 
leaving. Third, there was no realistic chance of a Leave vote winning.  
David Cameron’s memoirs were published in September 2019. He reports pursuing a 
‘renegotiation and referendum’ strategy from 2015 because he was convinced that a poll 
would happen in the near future anyway and, under a more Eurosceptic Tory government, 
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would probably not offer the possibility of EU reform. Reflecting upon this decision, 
Cameron (2019, p. 623) states:  
Writing all this now, I completely accept that my strategy failed to achieve the 
outcome I desired. But at the time - and subsequently - I believed that the risks of 
doing nothing were greater. As I have said many times, that doesn’t mean I have no 
regrets, or do not believe that things could have been done differently or better in 
terms of the negotiation, or the campaign, or indeed the timing. But it is why I don’t 
regret the central decision to adopt a strategy of a renegotiation and referendum.     
According to Thompson (2017), the Brexit fiasco was not the accidental product of 
Cameron’s personal failings or the idiosyncrasies of his judgement in relation to his party. At 
some point before the planned 2020 election, it was probable (but not inevitable) that the 
issue of EU membership would need to be addressed within the Conservative party. Although 
Cameron used a risky strategy to solve this problem, Thompson (2017) suggests that the 
problem was not with his judgement but with the fundamental political weakness of Britain’s 
position inside the EU. In other words, the counterfactual situation would probably have 
resulted in a fiasco of some description or other, albeit at a slower pace. 
Before the 2016 referendum, Cameron used political means to create the false 
impression that Britain was powerful in Europe and that he had the power to renegotiate the 
EU–UK relationship. In truth, his ploy did not work because the EU’s leaders - particularly in 
Germany – realised that Britain was not well placed to renegotiate its position. Rejected in 
Europe, Cameron wished to create a good impression at home (Smith, 2016). With no real 
basis for claiming that he could secure a new deal, the prime minister resorted to the political 
device of announcing an in/out EU referendum as a means of diminishing Euroscepticism 
and improving his chances of winning the 2015 general election. By doing so, he made the 
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Leave campaign’s case by signalling to the British people that they had little control within 
the EU and should be given the opportunity to leave. Unfortunately, Cameron did not predict 
that Vote Leave would be fronted by the team of Boris Johnson and Dominic Cummings. 
During the ten-week referendum campaign, the popular politician and the astute political 
strategist fought the Remain campaign and won the majority of voter support (Shipman, 
2016). 
Is Leave deliverable? 
Given our claim that the Leave option was a systematic deception, the question remains of 
whether the referendum result can ever be delivered? During the General Election in 2019, 
Boris Johnson (who replaced Theresa May as prime minister in July 2019) used the slogan 
“Get Brexit Done”. The use of this message implies that: (i) Leave is a real, deliverable 
policy option, (ii) Parliament, the EU and Remainers are stopping the Conservative 
government following this possible political pathway, and (iii) the failure to deliver the 
referendum result was a policy fiasco caused by key political stakeholders since the 2016 
poll. In response, the former Conservative deputy prime minister, Michael Heseltine, said the 
slogan was a “great delusion” because it heralded years of further negotiations not an instant 
end because “The most you can do, if there were to be a massive Tory majority, is to get 
through the legislation to enable you to begin the talk about what the future relationship will 
be.” (Buchan, 2019). In contrast to Johnson’s optimism that all the details of our future 
relationship will be in place by December 2020, experience to date suggests that Brexit may 
not be done quickly, and will involve even more years of political and economic uncertainty 
(Rankin, 2019).   
Given that UK voters were systematically deceived, how can the Conservative 
government negotiate an exit option that convinces voters that the baseless Leave option is 
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deliverable? Again, working with Dominic Cummings as a chief special adviser to the prime 
minister, Johnson introduced the Withdrawal Agreement Bill, which passed (at second 
reading) on 20 December 2019 by 358 votes to 234, with a majority of 124. The legislation 
was required to ratify the withdrawal agreement made with the EU and ensures that the UK 
will leave Europe by 31 January 2020 (Hope and Sheridan, 2019). In an accompanying 
speech in the House of Commons, Johnson told parliament, "This is the time when we move 
on and discard the old labels of Leave and Remain” (Hope and Sheridan, 2019). He added, 
"In fact, the very words seem tired to me - as defunct as Big-enders and Little-enders, or 
Montagues and Capulets at the end of the play.”  
Given our argument that the Leave option is a baseless, systematic deception, Johnson 
speech is an interesting development. Trying to deliver the undefined Leave alternative has 
been consistently problematic for the Conservative government and led to a political failure 
for Theresa May. Speaking in December 2019, the ex-Conservative government minister, 
Kenneth Clarke, said that the situation remained the same, ‘I could never get out of Boris – 
and nobody so far could get out of Boris – what he has in mind for the eventual deal. To say 
they’re generalities is an understatement’ (Walker, 2019). In this policy void, by claiming 
that the Leave label is no longer relevant, the prime minister has been able to swerve the issue 
of whether this referendum option is deliverable or not. As far as UK legislation is concerned, 
the requirements of the Brexit poll will be delivered by 31 January 2020, but with detailed 
negotiations and policy development to follow.  
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we argue that the greatest trick pulled during the 2016 referendum was way in 
which David Cameron, the Electoral Commission and Vote Leave convinced voters that the 
Leave option did exist. Even if Vote Leave had been honest in their campaigning and had lost 
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the referendum, many people would have been convinced that Brexit was possible and could 
be delivered. In contrast, our analysis suggests that the referendum option (with its official 
seal of approval from the Electoral Commission), together with Vote Leave’s political 
campaigning, deceived many voters and stimulated their emotions in ways that encouraged 
them to choose an empty political bottle. If conventional, instrumental politics led by experts 
and analysts had played a bigger part in designing and describing the complexities of leaving 
the EU, then the straw casing of deceit may have been removed, exposing an empty political 
vessel. However, this raises the interesting question for further debate of whether, in our post-
truth world, voters wish to be deceived because they desire particular policy outcomes 
regardless of the underlying truths. 
Declaring Brexit a policy fiasco is not a neutral endeavour. Labelling political failures 
as fiascos is not an exercise based upon indubitable, objective facts, but relies upon the 
construction of narratives that embody debatable, subjective points of view. For many, the 
perspective that Leave was a baseless, systematic deception may conflict with their version of 
the truth. As an addition to the current policy studies literature, we argue the Brexit fiasco 
story should begin with Cameron and his construction of Leave as a (baseless) referendum 
option. Based upon this perspective, we conclude that Brexit should labelled a policy fiasco 
based upon political, process and programme failures that were intertwined with Cameron’s 
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